Abstract. This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivists ‗internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only ‗external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a ‗commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.
Introduction
Ordinary moral thought presupposes that moral values are mind-independent: the abhorrence of rape in no way depends on us thinking it abhorrent; torture would be wrong even if we didn't think it so. Generalising, it is not the case that thinking that some action possess a moral value makes it do so, nor is it the case that if our moral judgements were to change then the moral values would follow suit. 1 Moral values roam free of our thoughts about them.
This presupposition promises dialectical leverage in the meta-ethical debate between realists and expressivists. The former hold that moral judgements cognize a realm of moral properties, the later that they function to express attitudes for the purposes of mutual co-ordination. 2 For the realist, the mind-independence of moral truths is a simple consequence of the fact that moral reality is itself largely mindindependent. Expressivists, on the other hand, give no role to moral reality in their account of moral judgement, so on their view it is difficult to see on what the moral once thought only explicable on a realist meta-ethic -such as the ability of moral sentences to intelligibly embed in conditionals and the assumptions that moral judgements can be true, known and rationally disputed -are in fact compatible with expressivism. The completion of this project will result in a view of moral practice that both fits the basic expressivist understanding and legitimately possesses these features. Assuming that the assumption of mind-independence is one such feature there is a question whether it can be brought into the quasi-realist fold. As Zangwill notes: ‗[That] result would be extremely important. For it would bring [expressivism] back into line with ordinary moral thought. That is why quasi-realism is news'. 5 So how might the quasi-realist project proceed for the case of moral mind-independence?
What I shall call ‗the standard view' can be broken down into three stages. 6 The first involves ascertaining the content of claims of mind-independence. It is tempting to understand the commitment to mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought in an ontological way that assumes realism. For example, it is tempting to understand ‗The abhorrence of rape in no way depends on us thinking it abhorrent'
as claiming that the possession by instances of rape of the property of abhorrence in no way depends on our judgements concerning such a property. But expressivists can plausibly deny that our everyday engagement in moral discourse comes with such philosophically high-minded assumptions built in. Instead, claims of moral mindindependence can be understood in a way that assumes neither expressivism nor realism. For example, the above claim about the abhorrence of rape can be understood as maintaining simply that the correct application of the predicate ‗abhorrence' to the action of rape in no way depends on our propensity to so apply it. It is then a further question how this predicate and the conditions governing its application are to be understood, with realism and expressivism providing distinct alternatives.
Generalising, expressivists can urge that we understand the embedded claims of moral mind-independence as asserting not that the distribution of moral properties is independent of us but that the correct application of moral predicates is independent of us. Whether those predicates are property-ascribing (as realists hold) or attitude expressing (as expressivists hold) is then a further issue. 7 Having taken the realist sting out of the ordinary assumption of moral mindindependence the expressivist is in a better position to accommodate such claims.
This is the second stage of the standard view. The generalised (ontologically unassuming) claim of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral discourse can be captured by the following two negated conditionals (where x is an object of evaluation and M a moral predicate such as ‗wrong'):
(1a) It is not the case that if we think that x is M then x is M.
(1b) It is not the case that if we don't think that x is M then x is not M.
Conversely, the thought that the correct application of moral predicates does depend on our very application of them -the claim of moral mind-dependence -can be captured by the following conditionals:
(2a) If we think that x is M then x is M.
(2b) If we do not think that x is M then x is not M. 8 The second stage of the standard view, therefore, is for expressivists to provide an understanding of (1a) and (1b).
One way for expressivists to understand conditionals such as (2a) is in commitment-theoretic terms. 9 On such views we understand conditionals by understanding what their expression commits us to in terms of permissible and mandatory combinations of more basic commitments. So, by expressing a conditional sentence one expresses commitment to (i) endorsing the commitment expressed by assertoric use of the consequent should one come to endorse the commitment expressed by assertoric use of the antecedent and (ii) rejecting the commitment expressed by assertoric use of the antecedent should one come to reject the commitment expressed by assertoric use of the consequent. One advantage of this account is that the notion of ‗commitment' is broad enough to encompass both beliefs and the sorts of attitudes which, according to expressivists, moral judgements express.
Thus we do not treat conditionals with moral clauses in any way differently from conditionals with non-moral clauses. For example, to assert ‗If it rains, it pours' is to express commitment to believing that it is pouring should one come to believe it is raining and to rejecting the belief that it is raining should one reject the belief that it is pouring. Blackburn labels the complex commitments thus expressed, states of ‗tying oneself to a tree' of commitments. 10 The functional structure of these complex commitments is isomorphic with the propositional structure of the sentences used to express them.
Since the claims (1a) and (1b) are negated contexts, we are also owed an account of negation. Here again the expressivist can employ commitment-theoretic semantics. To accept the negation of a sentence is (trivially, uncontroversially) to deny that sentence. Psychologically, this involves rejecting the commitment that the unnegated use of the sentence expresses. Here again the notion of ‗commitment' is capricious, generating an univocal account of negation. For example, to accept the negation of ‗It's raining' is to reject the belief that it is raining hereabouts, that is, to reject the description of the world its content offers. The judgement ‗It is not the case that it is raining' expresses this rejection. Likewise, if Brian rejects the judgement that ‗Torture is wrong', he is, on the expressivist understanding of morality, rejecting the attitude which is expressed by the judgement ‗Torture is wrong'. This rejection is what is expressed in his judgement ‗It is not the case that torture is wrong'. Note that to reject a commitment -as it appears in the account both of conditionals and of negations -is not merely to lack that commitment. There is a difference between an agent who rejects belief in God and an agnostic, just as much as there is a difference between an agent who rejects moral disapproval of torture and an agent who has yet to form an opinion on the issue. 11 In each case, to reject a commitment is to be set against those who profess it in ways which those who merely lack the commitment are not. For example, to reject belief in God is to stand ready to oppose those who assert that He exists and the description of the state of the world such assertions offer.
Likewise, on an expressivist understanding of morality, to reject the moral disapproval of torture is to stand ready to oppose those insist upon others sharing their disapproval of torture: by engaging them in moral discussion, for example. 12 Such a disposition will be lacking in someone who simply hasn't formed an attitude on the matter (or thinks that no attitude can be justifiably formed It is such second-order attitudes that agents express by tying themselves to the particular trees of commitment involved in the moral mind-(in)dependence conditionals. Thus, only someone who rejects a moral sensibility on which moral attitudes to x hinge on our beliefs about those very attitudes will be tied to the tree of commitments involved in (1a) and (1b). Conversely, only someone who endorses a moral sensibility on which moral attitudes to x hinge on beliefs about those same attitudes will be tied to a tree of commitments involved in (2a) and (2b). To generalize: someone who asserts the mind-independence of moral values can be understood to approve of moral sensibilities on which moral attitudes hinge on beliefs about other things than our own moral attitudes. Conversely, some who asserts the mind-dependence of moral values can be understood to approve of sensibilities on which moral attitudes hinge on beliefs about those very attitudes. 16 Ultimately then, for expressivists any disagreement among agents concerning the mind-independence of values can be traced back to a moral disagreement concerning which moral sensibilities to approve of and which to disapprove of: those who accept mind-independence hold that our moral attitudes should depend on things other than our beliefs about those very attitudes; those who deny mind-independence hold that moral attitudes should depend on nothing more than beliefs about those very ‗internal reading': for it treats what may first appear to be a meta-ethical dispute as a substantial ethical one.
The third and final part of the standard view holds that this is a moral dispute for which the defenders of mind-independence hold the higher ground. According to Blackburn, the moral view of the defenders of mind-dependence is ‗absurd' (1981 p.179), ‗immodest' (1993 p.4), not ‗admirable' (1998 p.296) and involves endorsing moral sensibilities that ‗nice people' would not endorse (1984 p.218) . Commitment to moral mind-dependence is, in short, indicative of a repugnant moral view.
In summary, the standard view first strips the ontological pretensions from claims of mind-independence (first stage) and then regards them as speaking to a moral issue (second stage) on which the expressivist can stand with the righteous (third stage).
The Conceptual Truth in Moral Mind-independence
Zangwill has objected to the second stage of the standard view. He argues that the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral discourse have a conceptual status that is inconsistent with the internal reading. By conceptual status
Zangwill means that it is constitutive of competence with moral concepts that one recognises mind-independence. The argument for this is as follows (1994 pp.214-5) .
Anyone who grasps moral concepts must grasp that they can be successfully and unsuccessfully applied (this is a precondition of all moral argument). But moral concepts couldn't be unsuccessfully applied if their correct application depended merely on so applying them. So anyone who grasps moral concepts must grasp that their correct application doesn't depend on so applying them. That is, anyone who is competent with the deployment of moral concepts must, quite generally, accept mindindependence. Furthermore, Zangwill argues, the internal reading cannot account for this conceptual status (1994 pp.213-4) . If p is a conceptual truth about a range of concepts then one cannot abandon p without ceasing to trade in those concepts
altogether. Yet the internal reading takes claims of mind-independence to be founded on a substantive moral position and thus represent claims which, presumably, can be denied without abandoning morality altogether. So the internal reading is inconsistent with the conceptual status of claims of mind-independence. Such is Zangwill's argument.
Zangwill is right to argue that mind-independence has a conceptual status, but wrong to suggest this is inconsistent with the internal reading. The internal reading takes statements of mind-independence, like all moral statements, to be expressions of attitudes, the point of such expression being mutual co-ordination. Here mutual coordination means ‗living together' in the broadest sense. According to expressivists the goal of moral practice is to foster patterns of action and attitude that, at the very least, avoid ruinous conflict and, at the very most, allow for maximal flourishing of those things which people value. As Stevenson puts it, moral judgements are -instruments used in the complicated interplay and re-adjustment of human interests‖. 17 As I argue below, it is impossible for a set of concepts that express attitudes to also aid this co-ordinating role if agents employing those concepts do not accept that their correct application is, quite generally, mind-independent. And since all expressivists hold that moral concepts are essentially those deployed in this practice of mutual co-ordination they can claim that unless one adopts generalised mind-independence for the correct application of a set of expressive concepts then those concepts are not moral at all. 18 To see this, consider Freddy, who uses the term ‗blad' to express his disapproval of actions, such as kicking dogs. Freddy also accepts generalised minddependence for ‗blad', that is, he deems his application of the term ‗blad' to be correct just in case he so applies it. And since Freddy applies ‗blad' only to actions he disapproves of, he deems his application of the term ‗blad' to an action correct just in case he disapproves of that action. Freddy's term ‗blad', and the reasons that can be offered in support of its application, cannot be used to co-ordinate attitudes or actions, for two reasons. In the first place, for all that has been said Freddy's attitudes may be extremely fickle. His ‗blad' judgements will reflect any fickleness, making it extremely hard to predict his attitudes on the basis of these judgements. Secondly and more importantly, Freddy will not be able to use his term ‗blad' and the reasons why he applies it to effectively persuade others to share his attitudes of disapproval.
Suppose Freddy disapproves of kicking dogs and expresses this by saying ‗Kicking dogs is blad'. Someone else, who understands that ‗blad' expresses disapproval, asks:
‗Why is kicking dogs blad?'. What might Freddy say? Since he thinks it correct to apply ‗blad' to an action just in case he so applies it, he might say that kicking dogs is blad because he thinks it is. This is not going to persuade anyone to adopt a similar attitude. Alternatively, since he also uses ‗blad' to express disapproval, Freddy might say that kicking dogs is blad because he disapproves of it. But this is clearly no reason for anyone else to share that disapproval. Thus for Freddy, there is no reason he can give that might be used both to justify the bladness of kicking dogs and to persuade people to adopt an attitude of disapproval towards the practice. More generally, reasons for bladness could never be reasons for possessing particular attitudes.
Therefore though Freddy's term ‗blad' expresses attitudes, it cannot be used to coordinate them.
On the other hand, if a set of concepts are used to express attitudes, and the correct application of those concepts depended on something other than the fact that agents so applied them, those concepts would be apt to co-ordinate attitudes. Consider
Faye, who uses the term ‗bland' to express disapproval of actions. Unlike Freddy,
Faye accepts the generalised mind-independence claim for ‗bland', that is, she deems the correct application of the term ‗bland' to depend on something other than the fact she so applies it. In fact, Faye takes the blandness of actions to depend on whatever the associated attitude depends on. For example, if she disapproves of kicking dogs because it causes them pain, the judgement of blandness that expresses this disapproval will likewise depend on the fact that kicking dogs causes them pain.
When someone asks Faye ‗Why is kicking dogs bland?' she will have a response:
kicking dogs is bland because it causes them pain. This is the reason that Faye takes kicking dogs to be bland, but also a reason that might persuade others to adopt the disapproval towards kicking dogs that such a judgement expresses. 19 Thus for Faye there is a feature of kicking dogs that both justifies its blandness and can be used to persuade others to adopt an attitude of disapproval towards it. More generally, reasons for blandness can also be reasons for possessing particular attitudes. 20 Therefore
Faye's term ‗bland' can be used both to express attitudes and to co-ordinate attitudes with others.
The difference between Freddy and Faye is that the former rejects, whereas the latter adopts, the commitment which, according to the internal reading, is expressed by generalised mind-independence. So these examples demonstrate that unless agents adopt the commitments expressed by statements of mind-independence for a set of attitude-expressing concepts they will not be able to use those concepts to co-ordinate in the way morality requires. Thus the expressivist response to Zangwill's objection can proceed: since moral concepts are essentially co-ordinating and since one cannot use a set of attitude-expressing concepts to co-ordinate unless one accepts their correct application to be governed, quite generally, by mind-independence, it follows that mind-independence is, quite generally, a conceptual truth about morality.
Since this is compatible with understanding claims of mind-independence in the expressivist way Zangwill is wrong to maintain that the internal reading cannot account for the conceptual status of moral mind-independence.
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Zangwill anticipates the claim that the adoption of certain (second-order) attitudes towards ways of forming (first-order) attitudes may be necessary for the latter to count as moral attitudes and raises two objections (1994 pp.215-7) . The first is that such an account must abandon the internal reading, since any attitude that converts first-order attitudes such as those of Freddy into moral attitudes such as those of Faye cannot itself be a moral attitude. But this is simply false. Faye accepts, whereas Freddy rejects, that one's attitude to kicking dogs ought not to depend on that very attitude (or -equivalently -that the correct application of the attitude-expressing concept ought not to depend on its very application). The above argument shows that one must adopt this attitude if one is to engage in a practice of co-ordination and hence make any further moral judgements. 22 But it doesn't follow that the attitude is not itself a moral one. The expressivist can insist that competence with moral concepts requires taking at least one substantive moral position, just as competence with some descriptive concepts requires applying them to some paradigm cases. This does, of course, alter the justification for the attitude expressed by claims of mindindependence, that is, it abandons the third stage of the standard view. For the reason to adopt such attitudes is no longer that the alternatives are ‗immodest' or not ‗admirable' but that one couldn't attempt to co-ordinate otherwise. But in so far as the needs of co-ordination justify the adopting of an attitude (and hence a moral position) the internal reading persists.
Zangwill's second objection is that on this expressivist account, moral attitudes are not appropriate or inappropriate in themselves, but only when regulated by a system of higher-order attitudes such as those possessed by Faye. According to Zangwill, ‗this loses track of the intuitive idea that the feeling, say, of moral horror, is appropriate just in virtue of that to which the horror is a response ' (1994 pp.216-7) . It is true that on the present account attitudes such as approval and disapproval are not appropriate or inapprioriate in themselves, but only when located within a practice of mutual co-ordination, a practice which mandates the adoption of certain higher-order attitudes. But this is to be expected -a similar point applies to beliefs, whose appropriateness or inappropriateness can only be understood by reference to the practice in which they are embedded, in their case the practice of correctly representing the state of the world. Furthermore, the present account is able to explain the ‗intuitive idea' that Zangwill elucidates, for from the perspective of an agent such as Faye (who adopts the higher-order attitude of mind-independence mandated by the needs of co-ordination) the appropriateness of moral horror will depend solely on features of the world (the pain caused by kicking dogs, for example). So having the attitude expressed by claims of moral mind-independence is an enabling condition for the phenomenology that Zangwill highlights.
There are three final points to note about this reply to Zangwill. First, it emphasises that the original motivation for the internal reading was not a distrust of conceptual claims about morality. Despite sometimes being thought of as a view that prefers to treat all apparently meta-ethical questions as immanent ones, the form of expressivism that embraces the quasi-realist project is comfortable with claims about the machinations of our moral concepts. One of these is the expressivist insight that it is constitutive of competence with moral concepts that one uses them to express attitudes. The present reply merely extends the point: it is also constitutive of that competence that one accepts mind-independence. These conceptual claims can now be seen to have the same origin: the needs of mutual co-ordination. So mindindependence adds substance to quasi-realist talk of the standards governing the coordinating practice their view identifies with morality (see Blackburn 1984 ch.6 ).
Second, this discussion (following Zangwill) has concerned only what we might call judgement-independence, that is, the independence of moral value from our judgements about such value. We may distinguish other forms of mind-independence, for example blushing-independence -the independence of the moral value of actions from our propensity to blush at those actions -and nausea-independence -the independence of the moral value of actions from our propensity to be made nauseous by those actions. Thus we might consider a stronger claim of mind-independence: that the moral value of actions does not depend on any of our reactions towards them.
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This appears true in some cases. For example, the wrongness of kicking dogs doesn't depend on us thinking it wrong, but neither does it depend on the fact that most of us find such acts shocking. The wrongness depends on facts about dogs (their sentience)
not on facts about us. It is important to note that Zangwill's argument for conceptual status doesn't apply to non-judgemental types of mind-independence. This is because moral concepts could still be incorrectly applied if their correct application depended on our responses, so long as the responses their correct application depended on were not the judger's own moral judgements. For example, the view that the wrongness of actions is dependent on whether or not they make Gordon Brown blush could still accept that all judgements of wrongness (including those made by Gordon Brown) may be incorrect. For non-judgemental forms of mind-independence, therefore, the expressivist can adopt the standard view. To assert that the wrongness of actions does not depend on whether they make Gordon Brown blush is to express disapproval of a moral sensibility for which moral attitudes to actions depend on one's beliefs about Gordon Brown's reactions to those actions. Adopting such an attitude is not a condition on using moral concepts at all (moral concepts could still be used to coordinate if their correct application depended on Gordon Brown's proclivities) but remains an implausible moral position. So where claims of moral mind-independence are conceptual expressivists can adopt the response elucidated here to explain why they are. Where such claims are not conceptual the unsupplemented standard view will suffice.
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One final desirable feature of this account of the common-sense commitment to moral mind-independence is that it is, in structure, no different to the account one might give of the mind-independence of more straightforwardly descriptive predicates, such as ‗is circular'. For this case, the mind-independence conditionals are (where C is ‗circular'):
(3a) It is not the case that if we think that x is C then x is C (3b) It is not the case that if we do not think that x is C then x is not C.
And the mind-dependence conditionals:
(4a) If we think that x is C then x is C (4b) If we do not think that x is C then x isn't C.
Here, the same commitment-theoretical account will apply: accepting (4a) and (4b) is to tie oneself to (i) believing that x is C should one come to believe that we think x is C and (ii) rejecting the belief that x is C should one come to believe that we lack this thought. Likewise, accepting (3a) and (3b) is to commit oneself to rejecting these complex commitments. The former will be to hold that the predicate ‗circular' is correctly applied just when we apply it; the latter that the conditions of its correct application depend on something other than our mere propensity to apply it. The only difference with the moral case, so far, is that here both of the basic commitments involved are beliefs, whereas in the moral case one of the commitments is a moral attitude.
Again mirroring the account of moral mind-independence, the reason agents might want to tie themselves to the particular combinations of commitments expressed by (3a), (3b), (4a) and (4b) is because they endorse particular ways of forming and regulating commitments; in this case particular ways of forming and regulating beliefs about circularity. Call a particular way of forming and regulating a commitment (be it belief or moral attitude) a sensibility. Only an agent who endorses a sensibility on which beliefs about circularity depend on our beliefs about those very beliefs would share the commitment expressed by (4a) and (4b). Conversely, only an agent who rejects a sensibility on which beliefs about circularity depend on our beliefs about those very beliefs would share the commitment expressed by (3a) and (3b). Thus, as in the account of moral mind-independence, the debate about circular mind-independence can be traced to a debate about which ways of forming and regulating commitments we are best to endorse.
The difference between the mind-independence in the case of moral values and mind-independence in the case of circularity (for example) is only made apparent when we consider the story concerning why particular sensibilities are the best to endorse. In the circularity case, the ways of forming and regulating commitments it makes sense to endorse will be those that are considered likely to produce beliefs whose descriptive content matches the state of the world. One reason for endorsing these mechanisms rather than others is the function of beliefs: beliefs function to guide us around the world and we are more likely to be successful in our actions when the descriptive content of beliefs matches the state of the world. 25 Likewise, in the moral case, I have argued that the ways of forming commitments that it makes sense to endorse are those that aid the function of morality, namely co-ordination. (I then argued that endorsement signalled by certain claims of moral mind-dependence make such co-ordination impossible). In general then, what sensibilities (ways of forming and regulating commitments) we endorse will be those considered most likely to be conducive to the function of the commitments in question. Though beliefs and moral attitudes have different functions, both these functions are aided when we endorse sensibilities which reject the idea that the commitment is correctly held just when we (or others) hold it. In so far as the claims of mind-independence have us expressing these endorsements, the claims of mind-dependence in the two cases are dealt with in fundamentally the same way. What differs is the reason why we make these endorsements and that in turn depends on the differing functions of the commitments in question. The key insight of the foregoing account is that it is not only the descriptive function possessed by beliefs that necessitates endorsing the sort of sensibilities that make the correct application of a predicate dependent on something other than the mere fact we apply it.
Essential Mind-Independence
A recent paper (Jenkins 2005) has argued that there is a further type of mindindependence that expressivism cannot accommodate. According to this view we can distinguish the following claims: :
(1) What it takes for kicking dogs to be wrong is independent of our own responses.
(2) What it is for kicking dogs to be wrong is independent of our own responses.
The first claim concerns the issue of what standards have to be met in order for the relevant sentence to be correctly asserted; it is a matter of sufficient conditions for correct assertion. More precisely, it asserts that the conditions that have to be met in order for ‗Kicking dogs is wrong' to be correctly assertible do not involve our own responses. The second claim expresses an essentialist notion of mind-independence: it is no part of what it is for kicking dogs is wrong to be the case that our mental lives are thus-and-so (or perhaps would be thus-and-so after tutoring).
The distinction between these claims is brought out by the following example.
What it takes for Blackadder to be funny is for him to start singing a song about a
goblin, but what it is for him to be funny is to make us laugh. The former is an issue of what the standards governing the application of ‗funny' are (apply this concept when someone sings goblin songs) the latter an issue of what those standards are for (tracking our mirth). In the moral case, the internal reading allows the quasi-realist to accommodate the first sort of mind-independence: the standards governing the application of moral concepts make that application responsive to features of the actions judged, not the judger's own responses. It is approval of such standards that, on the internal reading, is expressed by claims of mind-independence. (I have argued above that in some cases the basic needs of co-ordination necessitate such approval).
The worry is that when it comes to the second type of mind-independence -the what it is for type -the quasi-realist must say the same about morality as seems plausible for being funny, thus committing himself to a form of mind-dependence after all.
The worry is not fatal to expressivists, for two reasons. for an action to be wrong will not be as simple as the answer given for what it is for something to be funny. In fact, the most perspicuous (though still in many ways unsatisfactory) way of phrasing the expressivist answer to that question is something like: what it is for something to be wrong is for the particular moral attitude that is expressed by judgements of wrongness to be warranted by the standards applying to the distinctive practice of mutual co-ordination of attitude and action that is morality.
Note that this answer adopts an external, meta-ethical perspective; so this is one instance where the internal reading is not enough. It also requires much elaboration: what it is for something to be wrong distinguishes expressivists both from realists and from those who would accept the essentialist type of mind-dependence for wrongness as seems plausible for being funny. Realists will say that what it is for something to be wrong is for it to possess the property of wrongness (and may go onto say that this is reducible to other properties) and hence that the standards for saying whether an action is wrong make us responsive to this property. Those who accept essentialist mind-dependence will say that what it is for something to be wrong is for us to judge it wrong (or disapprove of it, or be made nauseous by it or…) and hence that the standards for saying whether an action is wrong are standards that make us responsive to our own reactions. The expressivist denies both claims: for expressivists the standards for saying whether something is wrong make us good co-ordinators, not good detectors of either moral properties or our own reactions. Thus expressivism can simultaneously avoid the unflattering comparison with the account of being funny whilst distinguishing themselves from realists.
Jenkins objects to this expressivist way of answering the what it is for
question. By interpreting essential mind-independence as an external, meta-ethical claim and by denying that moral standards function to make us responsive to our own attitudes, the expressivist, Jenkins claims, is committed to a position in tension with her anti-realism. This is because the debate between realism and anti-realism concerns ‗whether or not something's being wrong…is a matter of our taking a negative attitude towards it' (Jenkins 2005 pp.207-8) , with the anti-realist presumably answering that it does. But if this is ‗anti-realism' it is not part any professed expressivist view. Expressivists do not claim that an action's being wrong is a matter of taking an attitude towards it -they claim that judging an action wrong is a matter of taking an attitude towards it. Theirs is a theory of judgement, not of value. For expressivists an action's being wrong is either -on the internal reading -a matter of it meeting one's standards governing the formation of moral attitudes (e.g. being such as to cause pain) or -on the external reading -a matter of being such that a distinctive negative attitude towards it is warranted by the standards governing mutual co-ordination (of which, I have argued, judgement-independence is one, supervenience another). To think otherwise is to revert to the error of mistaking expressive theories of ethics for subjective ones. Together, these two aspects of the expressivist strategy provide considerable cause for optimism. In so far as the first aspect of the strategy is available, the features of moral discourse that need accommodating become less daunting. In so far as the practical nature of morality is understood the resources available to the expressivist to explain the complexities of moral discourse are increased. That is why quasi-realism is still news.
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expressive term can at least offer some reason which serves both to justify the judgement and may potentially alter attitudes. Agents who deny mind-independence for such terms (such as Freddy) can achieve no such leverage through their usage. 21 Might a similar reasoning apply to comic or gastronomic judgements? While it is true that an agent who accepts mind-dependence for his comic judgements cannot hope to offer reasons to persuade others to share them, it seems less obvious that comic judgements are essentially part of a co-ordinating practice. Attempts to persuade others to share our sense of humour usuallygive out long before attempts to persuade others to share our moral outlook. 22 It follows that all moral thinkers are either implicit aware of morality's co-ordinating function (where this recognition constituted by the adoption of the moral mind-independence attitude) or both implicitly and explicitly aware of this. This seems reasonable given that all discussions of moral mindindependence present it as an integral part of everyday engagement with moral discourse. 23 Since not all reactions are psychological ‗response-dependence' might be a more appropriate term here. 24 Zangwill (1994 p.207) 
